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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new
privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its
essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not
freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.
Religious loyalties may be exercised without hindrance from
the state, not the state may not exercise that which except by
leave of religious loyalties is within the domain of temporal
power." 43 And again: "The validity of secular laws cannot be
measured by their conformity to religious doctrines. It is only
in a theocratic state that ecclesiastical doctrines measure legal
right or wrong."44
HmRmy G. KINCAM
A REviEw oF INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES FROM TAXATION
The latest of a series of cases in which the Supreme Court has re-
examined the doctrine of implied constitutional immunities of federal
and state governments from taxation by the other is New York v.
United States.' The language employed in these cases is significant in
its tendency to regard the doctrines as fallacious insofar as they afford
immunity to state instrumentalities against federal taxation, while re-
affirming federal supremacy in the tax field. The danger of the recent
Supreme Court decisions lies not in the results on the merits, nor in
the narrow application of the doctrine of implied immunities, but in
the according of immunity to the instrumentalities of the federal gov-
ernment without a reciprocal immunity to those of the state govern-
ments. Thus, the power to tax becomes a power to widen the scope of
federal economic and political power at the expense of an equal right
in the states.
The present condition of the law leaves the governments of the
states in a position where they are suffering increased burdens from
federal taxation and at the same time are being deprived of legitimate
subjects of taxation by the almost daily entry of the federal government
into the field of private enterprise. On the other hand, the federal gov-
ernment is expanding its proprietary enterprises exempt from state tax-
ation and is reaping a harvest through taxation of state and municipal
services.
"West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 653, 63 S. Ct.
1178, 1192, 87 L. ed. 1628 (1943).
"West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 654, 63 S.
Ct. 1178, 1193, 87 L. ed. 1628 (1943).
'326 U. S. 57, 66 S. Ct. 3zo, go L. ed. 265 (1946).
[Vol. IV
NOTES
One-half of the historical doctrine, that relating to federal immun-
ity from state taxation, is based upon Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in McCulloch v. Maryland2 where, rather than holding a state tax on
bank notes issued by the Bank of the United States unconstitutional
because plainly discriminatory, he announced the total absence of any
right to tax the means employed by the federal government in the ex-
ecution of its powers. Chief Justice Marshall's language, which later
became the basis for a broad doctrine of intergovernmental immunities,
is couched in the following phraseology:
"That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the
power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to
create; that there is a plain repugnance, in conferring on one
government a power to control the constitutional measures of
another, which other, with respect to those very measures, is
declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, are
propositions not to be denied."3
However, this and later statements clearly indicate that Marshall
was not establishing intergovernmental immunities but merely im-
munity of the federal government, and, furthermore, promulgating a
doctrine of federal taxation supremacy under the Supremacy Clause:4
"The question is, in truth, a question of supremacy; and if the
right of the states to tax the means employed by the general
government is conceded, the declaration that the Constitution,
and the laws made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme
law of the land, is an empty and unmeaning declamation." 5
To the argument that the power of taxation in the federal and state
governments is concurrent and that each had power to tax instrumen-
talities of the other, Chief Justice Marshall expressly dissented and
drew his often-quoted distinction between the government of the whole
taxing a part, the state, and that of a part taxing the whole.6
24 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819).
34 Wheat. 316, 431, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819).
4U. S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2.
54 Wheat. 16, 433, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819).
""But the two cases are not the same. The people of all the states have created
the general government, and have conferred upon it the general power of taxation.
The people of all the states, and the states themselves, are represented in Congress,
and, by their representatives, exercise this power. When they tax the chartered in-
stitutions of the state, they tax their constituents; and these taxes must be uniform.
But, when a state taxes the operations of the government of the United States, it
acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by the people
over whom they claim no control. It acts upon the measures of a government created
by others as well as themselves, for the benefit of others in common with themselves.
19461
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On the basis of the above language and the political need in 18ig
of strengthening the position of the federal government, it can hardly
be controverted that Chief Justice Marshall intended to imply a con-
stitutional immunity to the federal government and to deny a like
immunity to the states.7 At a time when the infant national govern-
ment was in great need of protecting its undeveloped tax revenues and
strengthening its political power in the face of States' Rights opposi-
tion, such statements were justified to emphasize federal supremacy.
During the following fifty years the position of the federal govern-
ment was immensely strengthened because of economic security gained
through increased taxation revenues, and favorable interpretation of
the Constitution by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Marshall's
language was frequently employed in later decisions, emphasizing the
immunity of the federal government from interference and burden
through state taxation of specific subjects and activities.8 However,
due to political expediency, Congress soon imposed one limit to this
doctrine of absolute immunity by providing for state non-discrimina-
tory taxation on shares of national banks in the hands of individuals.9
The Supreme Court in Van Allen v. The Assessors'° held that though
The difference is that which always exists, and always must exist, between the ac-
tion of the whole or a part, and the action of a part on the whole; between the
laws of a government declared to be supreme, and those of a government which,
when in opposition to those laws, is not supreme." 4 Wheat. 316, 435, 4 L. ed. 579
(1819).
7However, the contention is made in the dissenting opinion in New York v.
United States, 326 U. S. 572, 66 S. Ct. 310, 321, 90 L. ed. 265 (1946) that other
language of Marshall is sufficient to sustain the case for reciprocal immunity. See
4 Wheat. 316, 429, 4 L. ed. 579 (t819). But, the last sentence of the quoted paragraph
omitted from the opinion in the principal case, whatever the implication in the
previous context, limits immunity to the federal government: "The attempt to use
it on the means employed by the government of the Union, in pursuance of the
Constitution, is itself an abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which the
people of a single state cannot give." 4 Wheat. 316, 430, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819).
'Tax on a branch of a Bank of the United States, Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 204 (1824); tax on federal securities owned by a pri-
vate citizen, Weston v. City of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. ed. 481 (1829); income
tax on an officer of the federal government, Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435,
1o L. ed. 1022 (1842); tax on the nominal capital of a state bank invested in federal
securities, Bank of Commerce v. New York, 2 Black 62o, 17 L. ed. 451 (1862); tax
measured by the capitalization of state banks partially invested in federal securities,
Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200, 17 L. ed. 793 (1864); tax on certificates of indebted-
ness of the federal government, The Banks v. The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16, 19 L. ed- 57
(1868); tax on United States bank notes, Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26, 19 L. ed.
60 (1868).
913 Star. 99 (1864).
103 Wall. 573, 18 L. ed. 229 (1865). See also, Bradley v. People, 4 Wall. 459, 18
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the constitutional immunity of the federal government was "absolute,"
Congress, having created the instrumentality, could limit the immunity.
Only one judicial inroad was made into the doctrine of absolute
immunity. In Thomson v. Pacific Railroad" the Supreme Court held
that in the absence of affirmative prohibition on the part of Congress,
a state tax on an agency of the federal government was valid. Only a
dictum in one case' 2 and the dissenting opinion in another 3 even sug-
gested any further limitation on immunity.
Thus, on entering the era subsequent to the War Between the
States, the implied constitutional immunity of the federal government
was absolute, subject only to the intent of Congress. As a result of the
outcome of the War, confirming the supremacy of the national govern-
ment, the government of the Union reached the stage of development
where its economic and political power exceeded the aggregate of that
of the several states.
With this background, the decision of Collector v. Day'4 established
the other half of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities. There
L. ed. 433 (1866); People v.Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244, i8 L. ed. 344 (1866); Na-
tional Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353, 19 L. ed. 701 (1869).
29 Wall. 579, 19 L. ed. 792 (1869). While a distinction was made between means
employed by the government and property of agents employed by the government,
on the basis of dictum in McCulloch v. Maryland, silence on the part of Congress
was treated as affirmative consent to tax. As a corollary see Bank v. Supervisors, 7
Wall. 26, 19 L. ed. 6o (1868).
"National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353, 362, 19 L. ed. loi (1869): "The
limitation is, that the agencies of the federal government are only exempt from
state legislation, so far as that legislation may interfere with, or impair their efficien-
cy in performing the functions by which they are designed to serve the government.
Any other rule would convert a principle founded alone in the necessity of secur-
ing to the government of the United States the means of exercising its legitimate
powers, into an unauthorized and unjustified invasion of the rights of the states."
"Weston v. City of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 479, 7 L. ed. 481 (1829), where a dis-
tinction was made in the dissenting opinion on the basis of the direct or indirect
nature of the tax with regard to the federal government.
U11 Wall. 113, 2o L. ed. 122 (1870). As immediate background for this case
there is the decision in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (1869) where
the right of the federal government to tax an instrumentality of a state was chal-
lenged for the first time and upheld on narrow grounds. A federal tax on state
bank notes, the object of the tax being to drive state bank notes out of existence,
was declared valid under the constitutional power of the federal government to pro-
vide a uniform currency. However, it was conceded that "... and to employ all
necessary agencies for legitimate purposes of state government, are not proper sub-
jects of the taxing power of Congress." 8 Wall. 533, 547, 19 L. ed. 482 (1869). Further
support for the Day case is drawn from dictum in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700,
725, 19 L. ed. 227 (868): "Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and
independent autonomy to the states, through their union under the Constitution,
but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the states, and the
1946]
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the Supreme Court held that a non-discriminatory federal income tax
imposed upon the salary of a state officer was unconstitutional as con-
stituting a burden on an instrumentality of the state government. In
a well-considered opinion, Mr. Justice Nelson pointed out that there
was no express constitutional prohibition upon the state against taxing
the means or instrumentalities of the federal government but necessary
implication required such prohibition as otherwise the states could
impair or destroy the functions of the federal government. Further-
more, he stated that the same construction applies to federal taxation
of state instrumentalities. The language of the opinion thus empha-
sizes the reciprocal nature of intergovernmental immunities:
"And if the means and instrumentalities employed by that gov-
ernment to carry into operation the powers granted to it are,
necessarily, and, for the sake of self-preservation, exempt from
taxation by the states, why are not those of the states depending
upon their reserved powers, for like reasons, equally exempt
from federal taxation? Their unimpaired existence in the one
case is as essential as in the other."'15
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Bradley, on the other hand,
stressed Marshall's distinction between state taxation of federal in-
strumentalities and federal taxation of state instrumentalities, and
emphasized the supremacy of the federal taxing power. However, the
Court specifically rejected this distinction.16
Thus, at a time when the federal and state governments had reached
a balance of power in political and economic fields and there was no
maintenance of their government, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National
government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible states." Again, in Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall.
71, 77, 1g L. ed. ioi (1868) the Court, speaking of the taxing powers of the na-
tional and state governments, stated: "It is indeed a concurrent power, and in the
case of a tax on the same subject by both governments, the claim of the United
States, as the supreme authority, must be preferred; but with this qualification it is
absolute."
'511 Wall. 113, 127, 2o L. ed. 122 (1870). Mr. Justice Nelson continued: "It is
admitted that there is no express provision in the Constitution that prohibits the
general government from taxing the means and instrumentalities of the states, nor
is there any prohibiting the states from taxing the means and instrumentalities of
that government. In both cases the exemption rests upon necessary implication, and
is upheld by the great law of self-preservation; as any government, whose means
employed in conducting its operations, if subject to the control of another and dis-
tinct government, can exist only at the mercy of that government. Of what avail
are these means if another power may tax them at discretion?"
""The supremacy of the general government, therefore, so much relied on in
the argument of the counsel for the plaintiff in error, in respect to the question
NOTES
further need of judicial statesmanship to bolster the authority of the
federal government, the Supreme Court established a doctrine of con-
current taxing powers and reciprocal implied immunities. That such
doctrine was accepted by the outstanding constitutional authorities of
the day is shown by a declaration of Judge Cooley that "If the states
cannot tax the means by which the national government performs its
functions, neither, on the other hand and for the same reasons, can
the latter tax the agencies of the state governments."' 7
In the cases that followed until the turn of the century, it was em-
phasized that the immunity of the state governments was reciprocal
with that of the federal government. In Ambrosini v. United States,
holding a federal stamp tax inapplicable to bonds taken out by an in-
dividual in accordance with municipal license laws, Chief Justice Ful-
ler said:
"The general principle is that the means and instrumentalities
employed by the General Government to carry into operation
the powers granted to it are exempt from taxation by the States,
so are those of the States exempt from taxation by the general
government. It rests on the law of self-preservation, for any
government, whose means employed in conducting its strictly
governmental operations are subject to the control of another
and distinct government, exists only at the mercy of the latter."'
8
before us, cannot be maintained." ii Wall. 113, 126, 2o L. ed. 122 (1870). See also,
i Story Commentaries (4 th ed. 1873) 324 and Cooley, Constitutional Limitations
(3d ed. 1898) 36 on the concurrent taxing powers of the federal and state govern-
ments.
27Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (2d ed. 1883) 598. In justification of this
rule Cooley states: "It is the theory of our system of government that the state and
the nation alike are to exercise their powers respectively in as full and ample a
manner as the proper departments of government shall determine to be needful and
just, and as might be done by any other sovereignty whatsoever. This theory by
necessary implication excludes wholly any interference by either the state or the
nation with an independent exercise by the other of its constitutional powers. If
it were otherwise, neither government would be supreme within what has been set
apart for its exclusive sphere, but on the other hand, would be liable at any time to
be crippled, embarrassed, and perhaps wholly obstructed in its operations at the
will or caprice of those who for the time being wielded the authority of the other,
and that an exercise of the power to tax might have that effect is manifest from a
consideration of the nature of the power." Cooley, Taxation (ist ed. 1876) 57. See
also i Destry, Taxation (ist. ed. 1884) 67; Burroughs, Taxation (ist. ed. 1877) 120, 504.
28187 U. S. 1, 7, 23 S. Ct. 1, 3, 47 L. ed. 49 (1902). See also the following cases
holding federal taxes invalid as imposed on a state instrumentality: United States v.
Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322, 21 L. ed. 597 (1872); Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121
U. S. 138, 7 S. Ct. 826, 3o L. ed. 895 (1886). Compare, Van Brocklin v. Tennessee,
117 U. S. 151, 6 S. Ct. 670, 28 L. ed. 845 (1885).
.1946]
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The same position was taken in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.' 9
where the Supreme Court held a federal income tax invalid as applied
to income derived from municipal bonds.
However, due to the fact that both the federal and state govern-
ments began to tap new sources of tax revenue in the search for more
income to support increasing governmental activities, the overwhelm-
ing majority of the cases began to limit both federal and state immuni-
ties. Thus, it was held that property bequeathed to the United States
was subject to a state inheritance tax on the reasoning that the tax was
on the power of the testator to bequeath and was imposed before it
reached the hands of the government. 20 Conversely, it was held that
the federal government has power to tax the transmission of property
by legacy to states or their municipalities, and that such tax is on the
right to succeed to property, not on the state.
2 '
Other cases upheld the questioned tax as imposed on the right to
do business, not against the government instrumentality, 22 or on per-
sonal property of an individual even though it consisted of minerals
dug from federally owned lands,23 or on real property of an individual
upon which the government had only a claim.24 All of the enumerated
objects of taxation would seem to be clearly outside of the doctrine of
implied immunities as neither a means, property, nor instrumentality
of the government was involved, even though it was possible in each
case for the ultimate economic burden of the tax to fall upon the gov-
ernment.
One case arose, however, which to some extent disturbed the doc-
trine of absolute intergovernmental immunities. In Railroad Co. v.
Peniston,2 5 it was held that a state property tax could be validly im-
10157 U. S. 429 at 583, 15 S. Ct. 673 at 690, 39 L. ed. 759 at 821 (1894). In also
holding that a federal tax on the rents or income of real estate is a direct tax and be-
ing un-proportioned is unconstitutional, this decision necessitated the passage of
the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
2'United States v. Penkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 S. Ct. 1073, 41 L. ed. 287 (1895).
Accord, Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 20 S. Ct. 829, 44 L. ed. 998 (1899).
2"Snyder v Bettman, 190 U. S. 249, 23 S. Ct. 803, 47 L. ed. 1035 (1902). The dis-
senting opinion stressed the fact that the federal government had no power to reg-
ulate transmission of property on death, thus the constitutionality of its inheritance
tax was based solely on its power to tax, and it was accomplishing indirectly what it
could not do directly.
"Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 10 S. Ct. 593, 33 L. ed. 1025
(1889). But see Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. ed. 1o67 (88).
23Fauber v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762, 24 L. ed. 313 (1876).
"Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375, 25 S. Ct. 50, 49 L. ed.
242 (1904).
218 Wall. 5, 21 L. ed. 787 (1873). The majority felt that the doctrine of implied
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posed on a corporation formed under the laws of the United States.
A distinction was made on the basis of the effect of the tax-a tax on
the property causes only a remote interference with the exercise of gov-
ernmental power, but a tax on operations is a direct obstruction to the
exercise of this power. This ruling was counterbalanced somewhat, at
least so far as federal corporations are involved, by California v. Pacific
Railroad Co. 26 where it was held that a corporate franchise conferred
by Congress cannot be taxed by a state in the absence of Congressional
permission.
From the foregoing it can be seen that with the turn of the century,
while the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunities had been re-
stricted slightly from its original broad interpretation, the basic idea
had been reiterated so often in specific decisions and dicta that it had
become firmly implanted in the law. Even more significant is the fact
that the doctrine was completely accepted as one of reciprocity both
in the language and effect of the decision.
Two elements were now to begin a drastic limitation on the doc-
trine, especially as to instrumentalities of the states: one, the increas-
ing entry of the states into activities formerly regarded as limited to
private business; and, two, the growing need of additional federal
revenue. These elements induced a judicial attitude of discrimination
against the immunity of state instrumentalities at a time when the
federal government had not begun its program of operating economic
enterprises.
The inroads on the doctrine began with the case of South Carolina
v. United States27 though indications of the trend are seen at an earlier
date.28 The Supreme Court held that a federal liquor license tax was
immunities must be given a practical effect. Mr. Justice Bradley in his dissent felt
that this was a tax on a federal corporation under the rule of McCulloch v. Mary-
land.
2'127 U. S. 1, 8 S. Ct. m73, 32 L. ed. 150 (1887). The Court distinguished Rail-
road Co. v. Peniston on the basis that there the tax was on property while here it was
on the franchise. Nevertheless, the decision in its effect very narrowly restricted the
doctrine of the Peniston case.
2199 U. S. 437, 26 S. Ct. 11o, 5o L. ed. 261 (19o5).
281n United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322, 21 L. ed. 597 (1872) the ma-
jority opinion rejected the proposition that a municipality is subject to federal tax-
ation when acting outside of its ordinary governmental capacity because any power
exercised for the benefit of a state or municipality is in the course of government.
The dissenting opinion made the distinction that private property owned by a
municipality in a proprietary right and used merely for income, gain and profit is
taxable as if owned by an individual. In Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U. S. i, 23
S. Ct. 1, 47 L. ed. 49 (1902) the Court made an incidental statement that a municipal
1946]
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applicable to the liquor dispensary system conducted by the state of
South Carolina. Though the precise reasoning behind the decision is
a bit obscure, the court apparently makes a distinction between state
enterprise which is in the nature of ordinary private business for profit
and the usual, strictly governmental function. The former is taxable
as any business, while the latter is constitutionally immune from fed-
eral taxation. The Court pointed out that the tax is not on property
belonging to the state but is a charge on business, before any profits are
realized.29 It was emphasized that all cases condemning federal taxes
involved situations where property, means or an instrumentality was
employed by a state in the discharge of its ordinary function of gov-
ernment. But the Court failed to make a clear definition of what the
term "ordinary functions" connoted. Three dangers in the extension
of immunity to state-conducted business enterprise were enumerated:
one, the withdrawing of subjects and property from federal taxation;
two, the possibility that the ownership by a state of public utilities
might destroy the republican form of government, as private business
could not compete with tax exempt government-owned business; and,
three, the small but growing number of persons clamoring for state
ownership of all property and business, which, if realized, would render
the federal government impotent economically. An analogy was made
to the distinction between governmental and propriety activities in
the responsibility of a municipal corporation. Though the Court
clearly intended it only as an analogy to a field of law in which there
is considerable conflict of opinion,30 this distinction formed the basis
of a test of immunity which has, with variations, become accepted by
the Supreme Court.
31
In the following thirty years, the states continued to enter the busi-
ness field to a larger extent and the federal government's scope of tax-
ation was increased through the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment
bond was taken in the exercise of a function belonging to the city in its ordinary
govenmental capacity.
"The Court drew an analogy between this situation and those contained in
United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 S. Ct. 1073, 41 L. ed. 287 (1895) and Sny-
der v. Bettman, 190 U. S. 249, 23 S. Ct. 803, 47 L. ed. 1035 (1902).
1OFor a complete discussion of the conflicts of opinion as to this tort liability see:
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 Yale L. J. i, 129, 229.
"Thus in Flint v. Stone Tracey Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 S. Ct. 342, 55 L. ed. 389
(1990) the Court stressed that implied immunity has not been extended to exclude
merely private business from federal taxation although the power to exercise that
business is derived from the state. The exemption of state agencies from federal
taxation is limited to those of a strictly governmental character.
[Vol. IV
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to the Constitution providing for the income tax. These two factors
combined to furnish incentive to the Supreme Court to weaken further
the states' immunity from federal taxation, in order to bring income
derived from state conducted business within the purview of federal
income taxation. Though the immunity of the federal government
was frequently affirmed in many cases that followed,3 2 and in a few
cases, was limited on the basis of past decisions,33 reciprocity of im-
munities was further overbalanced in favor of the federal government
by one limited extension of federal immunity34 and by the adoption
of a new test of immunity and its application to specific factual situa-
tions discriminatingly against state immunity.
This new test of immunity was adopted in Metcalf and Eddy v.
Mitchell,35 where it was held that the salary of a consulting engineer
derived from employment by a state is subject to federal income tax-
ation. Aftdr strongly reaffirming the doctrine of reciprocal immunities,
the Count pointed out that the taxing power of either government,
when exercised in an admittedly necessary and proper manner, un-
avoidably has some economic effect upon the other. It follows that the
doctrine of immunities must be given a practical construction, balanc-
ing freedom from governmental interference against impairment of
nHome Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 27 S. Ct. 571, 51 L. ed. 9oi
(19o6); Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404, 33 S. Ct. i6, 57 L. ed. 275 (1912);
Farmers Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 34 S. Ct. 354, 58 L. ed. 7o06 (1913); Choc-
taw 0. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, 35 S. Ct. 27, 59 L. ed. 234 (1914); In-
dian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522, 36 S. Ct. 453, 60 L. ed. 779 (1915); Gillespie
v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 S. Ct. 171, 66 L. ed. 338 (1921); Federal Land Bank
v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374, 43 S. Ct. 385, 67 L. ed. 703 (1922); Northwestern Insur-
ance Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U. S. 136, 48 S. Ct. 55, 72 L. ed. 202 (1927); Long v. Rock-
wood, 277 U. S. 142, 48 S. Ct. 463, 72 L. ed. 824 (1927); McCallen Co. v. Mass., 279
U. S. 620, 49 S. Ct. 432, 73 L. ed. 874 (1928). See also C6hen and Dayton, Federal
Taxation of State Activities and State Taxation of Federal Activities (1925) 34 Yale
L. J. 807.
vTax on property used by an individual under a federal contract, Gnomer v.
Standard Dredging CO., 224 U. S. 362, 32 S. Ct. 499, 56 L. ed. 8oi (1911); tax on
premiums on federal bonds paid by insurance companies, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 240 U. S. 319, 36 S. Ct. 298, 6o L. ed. 664 (1915); tax on gross income
including that under a mail contract, Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 5o9, 51 S. Ct. 273,
75 L. ed. 496 (1930).
mIn Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341, 44 S. Ct. 121, 68 L. ed. 328
(1923) a state property tax was held invalid as applied to a corporation, chartered
by the federal government as part of the war effort, whose property was furnished
by the United States and whose entire bond and stock issue was federally owned.
The Court rejected the distinction in Thomson v. Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall. 579, 19
L. ed. 792 (1869), that taxation of the property of an agent is not taxation of the
means, on the basis of the peculiar facts of this case.
85269 U. S. 514, 46 S. Ct. 172, 7o L. ed. 384 (1925).
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the taxing power.3 6 In further holding that the effect of the particular
tax on the functioning of the state government was insubstantial, the
Court furnished the foundation for the test of "remoteness of burden"
which was followed in later cases with equal application to restrict
both federal and state immunity.3 7 The language of "burden" or "re-
moteness of burden" thus appears in the cases: a particular tax was
said to operate so as "directly to retard, impede and burden the ex-
ertion by the United States of its constitutional powers;" 8 in another
instance, that it would be difficult to suppose any case in which "the
adverse effects of the tax would be more remote or attenuated;"3 9 again,
that for a tax to be invalid "it must appear that the burden is real, not
imaginary; substantial, not negligible;" 40 and again, that no immunity
exists "where no direct burden is laid upon the governmental instru-
""But neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial
manner the exercise of its powers. Hence the limitation upon the taxing power of
each, so far as it affects the other, must receive a practical construction which per-
mits both to function with the minimum of interference each with the other; and
that limitation cannot be so varied or extended as seriously to impair either the
taxing power of the government imposing the tax; or the appropriate exercise of
the functions of the government affected by it." 269 U. S. 514, 523, 46 S. Ct. 172, 174,
7o L. ed. 384 (1925).
"In the following cases a state tax was held valid as constituting only a remote
interference to the federal government: Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S.
379, 51 S. Ct. 170, 75 L. ed. 4oo (193o); Susquehanna Power Co. v. Tax Commission-
er, 283 U. S. 291, 51 S. Ct. 434, 75 L. ed. io42 (193o); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286
U. S. 123, 52 S. Ct. 546, 76 L. ed. 1010 (1931), overruling Long v. Rockwood, 277
U. S. 142, 48 S. Ct. 463, 72 L. ed. 824 (1927); Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board of
Equalization, 288 U. S. 325, 53 S. Ct. 388, 77 L. ed. 812 (1932). In the following
cases a state tax was held invalid as constituting a burden on the federal govern-
ment: Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 6o9, 46 S. Ct. 592, 70 L. ed. 1112 (1925);
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 48 S. Ct. 451, 72 L. ed. 857 (1927). In the
following cases a federal tax was held valid as constituting only a remote burden
on the state government: Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 51 S. Ct. 125, 75 L. ed.
3o4 (193o); Group No. i Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279, 51 S. Ct. 432, 75 L. ed.
1032 (193o); Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 5o8, 53 S. Ct. 439, 77 L. ed.
925 (1932). Compare Wheeler Lumber Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 572, 50 S. Ct.
419, 74 L. ed. 1047 (1929) where the Court distinguished Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox,
on rather tenuous grounds. In the following cases a federal tax was held invalid
as constituting a burden on the state government: National Life Insurance Co. v.
United States, 277 U. S. 5o8, 48 S. Ct. 591, 72 L. ed. 968 (1927); Burnet v. Coronado Oil
& Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 52 . Ct. 443, 76 L. ed. 815 (1931).
"Excise Tax on sale of gasoline including that sold to the United States, Pan-
handle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 222, 48 S. Ct. 451, 453, 72 L. ed. 857 (1927)-
"Property tax on submerged land owned by licensee under Federal Power
Commission, Susquehanna Power Co. v. Tax Commissioner, 283 U. S. 291, 295, 51
S. Ct. 434, 435, 75 L. ed. 1042 (1930).
"°Income tax on profits from sale of municipal securities owned by an individual,
Wiilcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 234, 51 S. Ct. 125, 130, 75 L. ed. 304 (1930).
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mentality, and there is only a remote, if any, influence upon the ex-
ercise of the functions of government."
41
Thus, a doctrine of reciprocal implied immunities, qualified by
practical application on the basis of remoteness of governmental inter-
ference, became the order of the day. The d6ctrine was inherently
subject to inconsistencies in application and was applied more lenient-
ly in favor of the federal government.4 However, during this transi-
tional period, the Court oscillated between emphasis on "absolute"
immunity and sharp criticism of the whole concept of immunity. In
Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, after holding that a federal
excise tax was invalid as applied to motorcycles sold to a municipal
corporation, Mr. Justice Van Devanter stated for the Court that "where
the principle applies it is not affected by the amount of the particular
tax or the extent of the resulting interference, but is absolute." 43 Mr.
Justice Holmes, however, dissenting in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox,
stated:
"It seems to me that the state court was right. I should say plain-
ly right, but for the effect of certain dicta of Chief Justice Mar-
"Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 225, 51 S. Ct. 125, 127, 75 L. ed. 304 (1930).
"'hough variations of the same language were applied in limiting federal and
state immunities, it can be seen from an examination of the oil and gas lease cases
that the Supreme Court has been more prone to limit state immunity than federal im-
munity. Thus, it was held in Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 S. Ct. 171,
66 L. ed. 338 (1921), based on the decisions in Choctow 0. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison,
235 U. S. 292, 35 S. Ct. 27, 59 L. ed. 234 (z914) and Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240
U. S. 522, 36 S.Ct. 453, 6o L. ed. 779 (1915) that a state tax on the lessee of Indian
oil lands was void. This was followed by the decision in Group No. I Oil Corp v.
Bass, 283 U. S. 279, 51 S. Ct. 432, 75 L. ed. 1032 (1930) that a federal tax was valid
when imposed on the lessee of state oil lands, with the tenuous distinction that un-
der the state law the lease was regarded as a present sale of the oil and gas in
place. Surely the ultimate burden in these two situations will fall equally on the re-
spective governments. However, the Court did return to the doctrine of the Gill-
espie Case in the decision in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 52
S. Ct. 443, 76 L. ed. 815 (1931), only to repudiate it more forcibly in Burnet v. A.
T. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 508, 5a S. Ct. 439, 77 L. ed. 925 (1932), on the basis that
the burden on public use was greater where the United States was protecting its
wards, the Indians, than in the situation where the states were leasing their lands.
4283 U. S. 570, 575, 51 S. Ct. 6oi, 6oS, 75 L. ed. 1277 (193o). See also Trinity
Farm Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466, 471, 54 S. Ct. 469, 470, 78 L. ed. 918 (1933),
where Mr. Justice Butler, while holding valid a state excise tax on gasoline sold to
the United States because at most a burden which is consequential and remote, and
not necessary, immediate or direct, stated: "Its application does not depend upon
the amount of the exaction, the weight of the burden or the extent of the resulting
interference with sovereign independence. Where it applies, the principle is an
absolute one wholly unaffected by matters or distinctions of degree." This language
is inconsistent and wholly irreconcilable with the decision on the facts.
1946]
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shall which culminated in or rather were founded upon his
often quoted proposition that the power to tax is the power to
destroy. In those days it was not recognized as it is today that
most of the distinctions of the law are distinctions of degree. If
the States had any power it was assumed that they had all
power, and that the necessary alternative was to deny it alto-
gether. But this Court which so often has defeated the attempt
to tax in certain ways can defeat an attempt to discriminate or
otherwise go too far without wholly abolishing the power to tax.
The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this court
sits."44
This language of Mr. Justice Holmes pointed the way toward fur-
ther limitation on immunity in the cases that followed. For, it was
during the 1930's that the federal government began its social pro-
gram, with its corresponding economic and political expansion. This
introduced conflicting problems, the increasing need for federal
revenue and the necessity of protecting existing sources from the in-
roads of state enterprise on the one hand, and the threat to state reve-
nues from federal-conducted business enterprise on the other hand.
There followed in rapid succession a number of cases in which the
distinction evolved in South Carolina v. United States4 5 was enlarged
and the immunity of the states from federal taxation was- drastically
limited.46 In addition, several far-reaching decisions were rendered,
with respect to specific subjects or objects of taxation, which over-
ruled earlier cases. Thus in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe47 the
Supreme Court held that a state could impose a non-discriminatory in-
come tax on the salary of an attorney for the Federal Home Owners'
Loan Corporation. Mr. Justice Stone assumed that the corporation it-
self was immune, but decided that an income tax on the employee's
salary imposed no unconstitutional burden on the corporation. He
specifically stated that state as well as federal employees are within the
scope of the decision. Collector v. Day48 was overruled by name and
"277 U. S. 218, 223, 48 S. Ct. 451, 453, 72 L. ed. 837 (1927).
"199 U. S. 437, 26 S. Ct. o, 5o L. ed. 261 (1905).
"Compare for language and decision: Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 36o, 54 S.
Ct. 725, 78 L. ed. x3o7 (1933); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 55 S. Ct. 171, 79 L.
ed. 291 (934); Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U. S. 218, 58 S. Ct. 539, 82 L. ed. 758 (1937);
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. ed. 1a47 (1937); Allen v.
Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 58 S. Ct. 98o, 82 L. ed. 1448 (1927).
'73o6 U. S. 466, 59 S. Ct. 595, 83 L. ed. 927 (1938).
i i Wall. 113, 2o L. ed. 122 (1870). Though this case was overruled on its facts,
its doctrinal concept of reciprocal immunities was undisturbed. Expressly overruled




Dobbins v. Commissioners49 by implication.
Fortunately for the theory of reciprocity, most of the sweeping re-
laxations of immunity were applied alike to federal and state govern-
ments. In other cases the immunity was further limited with some dis-
crimination against the states.50 However, the most drastic encroach-
ment upon the reciprocity theory occurred as a result of those cases
which refused to apply to federal instrumentalities the distinction be-
tween proprietary and governmental functions.
In Federal Land Bank v. Bismark Co. the Court held that a state
tax on purchases made by a Federal Land Bank for property improve-
ments was invalid, and rejected the argument that this function of the
bank was proprietary rather than governmental:
"The federal government is one of delegated powers, and from
that it necessarily follows that any constitutional exercise ofits
delegated powers is governmental... It also follows that when
Congress constitutionally creates a corporation through which
the federal government lawfully acts, the activities of such cor-
poration are governmental." 51
"16 Pet. 435, io L. ed. 1022 (1842). Also overruled by implication, Brush v.
Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 57 S. Ct. 495, 81 L. ed. 691 (1936). The Court in effect
extended the results reached in Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 55 S. Ct. 171, 79
L. ed. 291 (1934) and Helvenng v. Gerhardt, 3o4 U. S. 4o5, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. ed.
1427 (1937). Compare, Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 3o3 U. S. 376, 58
S. Ct. 623, 82 L. ed. 907 (1937) overruling Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42
S. Ct. 171, 66 L. ed. 338 (1921) and Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U. S.
393, 52 S. Ct. 443, 76 L. ed. 815 (1931). See also Helvering v. Bauldine Oil Co., 303
U. S. 362, 58 S. Ct. 6i6, 82 L. ed. 897 (1937).
rOCompare, Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 53 S. Ct. 509, 77
L. ed. 1025 (1932); Graves v. Texas CO., 298 U. S. 393, 56 S. Ct. 8i8, 8o L. ed. 1236
(1935); Liggett & Myers Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 383, 57 S. Ct. 265, 81 L. ed.
301 (1936); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 2o8, 82 L. ed.
155 (1937)-
n314 U. S. 95, 102, 62 S. Ct. 1, 5, 86 L. ed. 65 (1941). Accord, New York ex rel.
Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, 57 S. Ct. 269, 8o L. ed. 306 (1936); Pittman v. Home
Owners' Loan Corp., 3o8 U. S. 21, 6o S. Ct. 15, 84 L. ed. 11 (1939)- See also May v.
United States, 319 U. S. 441, 63 S. Ct. 1137, 87 L. ed. 1504 (1942) which on its facts
is the strongest case which has arisen for the application of the proprietary as
against governmental distinction to the federal government. The Court held a
state inspection tax could not be imposed on fertilizer sold by the United States for
soil conservation purposes because this was a governmental activity. Is a state's
program to protect its natural resources of mineral water any less a governmental
function? While rejecting the distinction between proprietary and governmental
functions as applied to the federal government, the Court enlarged the application
of the distinction as to state instrumentalities in Helvering v Gerhardt, 3o4 U. S.
405, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. ed. 1427 (1937). Compare, Brush v. Commissioner, 3oo U. S.
352, 57 S. Ct. 495, 81 L. ed. 691 (1926), where the Court pointed out that the law
as to suability in tort of municipalities must be applied with caution as a test to
determine the extent of state activities which are subject to federal taxation be-
cause the law on this problem is subject to wide conflicts of opimon.
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The Court went on to hold that Congress can thus prescribe tax im-
munity for an agency it creates under its power to protect the means
for carrying out the functions of government.
52
Though rejecting the proprietary versus governmental distinction
as applied to the federal government, the Supreme Court did restrict
federal immunity in Alabama v. King and Boozer5 where it was held
that a state sales tax can be validly applied to material bought by a
contractor under a cost plus contract with the federal government,
even though the additional cost is admittedly passed on to the gov-
ernment.54 The Court indicated that in appropriate circumstances the
same rule would be applied to the state governments, and refused to
consider the question of whether Congress can, in the absence of con-
stitutional immunity, confer immunity where the economic burden of
the tax is passed on to the federal government.
The doctrine of federal supremacy and the constitutional ability
of the federal government to tax state instrumentalities with no cor-
responding reciprocity, received considerable emphasis in dicta, but
no decision was rendered upholding the validity of federal taxation
on the basis of this distinction alone. Mr. Justice Stone's comment in
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe indicates the trend of judicial
thought and affords a prediction for the future:
"The theory of the tax immunity of either government, state or
national, and its instrumentalities, from taxation by the other,
has been rested upon an implied limitation in the taxing power
of each, such as to forestall undue interference, through the
exercise of that power, with the governmental activities of the
"In Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 S. Ct. 595, 83 L. ed.
927 (1938) the Court employed the same language but refused to decide the question
whether Congress can confer immunity beyond the constitutional immunity of
federal agencies which the Courts have implied. See also dictum by Mr. Justice
Stone in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 411, n. 1, 58 S. Ct. 969, 971, n. 1, 82
L ed. 1427 (1937): "Congress may curtail an immunity which might otherwise be
implied, Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wall. 573 or enlarge it beyond the point
where, Congress being silent, the Court would set its limits." This leaves for future
decision the problem of to what extent Congress can by affirmative action either
restrict or enlarge the immunity of the federal government as distinguished from
its agencies in a manner inconsistent with that implicit in the Constitution. It
also leaves undecided the effect of silence on the part of Congress upon immunity of
agencies which it has created.
'314 U. S. 1, 62 S. Ct. 43, 86 L. ed. 3 (1941).
"The Court overruled expressions to the contrary in Panhandle Oil Co. v.
Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 48 S. Ct. 451, 72 L. ed. 857 (1927), and in Groves v. Texas Co.,
298 U. S. 393, 56 S. Ct. 818, 8o L. ed. 1236 (1935). Accord, Penn Dairies Inc. v. Milk
Control Commission, 318 U. S. 261, 63 S. Ct. 617 , 87 L ed. 748 (1942).
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other. That the two types of immunity may not, in all respects,
stand on a parity has been recognized from the beginning....,-55
The decision of Helvering v. Gerhardt56 introduced a new school
of thought, a "leave it to Congress" attitude in delineating the scope of
the states' immunity from federal taxation. In holding that the salaries
of employees of the Port Authority of New York were taxable by the
federal government, on the basis that such tax did not preclude any
function essential to the continued existence of the State government
and that the burden was speculative and uncertain, Mr. Justice Stone
emphasized that federal taxation of state enterprises is subject to politi-
cal restraints which will prevent abuses, because of the fact that Con-
gress is composed of representatives from the states.5 7 While the de-
cision as shown went off on other grounds this argument for political
rather than judicial handling of the problem has received increasing
support from constitutional authorities.5
8
With this background, the 1946 decision of New York v. United
States59 appears as a logical application of precedent. The controversy
was initiated when the federal government sought to collect a soft
drink excise tax 60 on mineral waters bottled at Saratoga Springs by an
03306 U. S. 466, 477, 59 S. Ct. 595, 597, 83 L. ed. 927 (1938). See also Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in which he makes a sharp attack on the doc-
trine of implied immunities and disputes the contention that they are correlative.
Accord, Helvering v. Gerhardt, 3o4 U. S. 4o5, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. ed. 1427 (1937).
03o4 U. S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. ed. 1427 (1937).
=Mr. Justice Stone speaking of the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland stated: "He was careful to point out not only that the taxing
power of the national government is supreme, by reason of the constitutional grant,
but that in laying a federal tax on state instrumentalities the people of the states,
acting through their representatives, are laying a tax on their own institutions and
consequently are subject to political restraints which can be counted on to prevent
abuse." 304 U. S. 405, 412, 58 S. Ct. 969, 971, 82 L. ed. 1427 (1937). The same reason-
ing was expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in New York v. United States, 326 U.
S. 572, 582, 66 S. Ct. 310, 314, 9o L. ed. 265 (1946): "After all, the representatives of
all the States, having, as the appearance of the Attorneys General of forty-six States
at the bar of this Court shows, common interests, alone can pass such a taxing mea-
sure and they alone in their wisdom can grant or withhold immunity from federal
taxation of such State activities."
O'Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities (1945) 58 Harv. L.
Rev. 757, 804: "It would seem incontestable that fairness demands rtciprocity be-
tween the states and the United States. It does not follow, however, that such red-
procity must have a constitutional foundation. Senators and representatives chosen
from the states ought to be duly mindful of state interests." Accord, Spahr, The
Leave-It-To-Congress Trend In The Constitutional Law of Tax Immunities (1946)
95 U. Pa. L. Rev. i. See also Dowling, Constitutional Developments In Five War
Years (1946) 32 Va. L. Rev. 461.
C9326 U. S. 572, 66 S. Ct. 310, go L. ed. 265 (1946).
e°Revenue Act of 1932 § 615 (a) (5), 47 Stat, i6g, 264, 26 U. S. C. A. 614 (1932).
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agency of the State of New York, which had acquired title to the springs
as part of its conservation program. The springs were operated by the
Saratoga Springs Authority, a public benefit corporation of the State,
and the profit from the bottled mineral water was used to defray par-
tially the expense of operating the springs, the remainder of these ex-
penses being met by legislative appropriations. 61 The state claimed
immunity from federal taxation on the basis that in conserving its
natural resources it was engaged in the exercise of a usual, traditional
and essential government function and not a proprietary enterprise.
The problem was of sufficient importance that forty-five states were
given leave to file briefs amici curiae.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter announced the decision of the Court. He
quickly disposed of the case on the basis of South Carolina v. United
States,63 holding that soft drinks are in the same category as hard
drinks and thus the federal tax can validly be applied to the mineral
water.63 But in view of the interest manifested by the forty-five states
filing briefs, he saw fit to give the problem further consideration.
He began his more detailed analysis with another sharp attack on
equivalence in the implications of taxation immunity of the state and
federal governments, using language similar to that employed in his
concurring opinion in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,6 4 and bas-
ing his philosophy on the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley in
Collector v. Day.65 He re-emphasized his belief in the invalidity of the
notion of reciprocal inter-governmental immunity with the observa-
tion that "the considerations bearing upon taxation by the States of
activities or agencies of the federal government are not correlative
with the considerations bearing upon federal taxation of State agencies
or activities." 66 After pointing out that the distinction between govern-
mental and proprietary functions was too shifting and intangible a
basis for determining the extent of federal taxing power, he noted that
0tA brief history of the Springs is given in the opinion. Prior to the acquisition
by the state, private operations had substantially diminished the flow due to ex-
cessive pumping. The purpose of the state in purchasing the property was to con-
serve the Springs for beneficial operation. The sale of mineral water and profits
from operation of the property as a health resort were never sufficient to defray the
operating costs.
'199 U.S. 437, 26 S. Ct. 11o, 50 L. ed. 261 (1905).
Tnhus affirming the decisions of the two lower federal courts, 14o F. (2d) 6o8
(C. C. A. 2d, 1944); 48 F. Supp. 15 (N. D. N. Y. 1942).
"3o6 U. S. 466, 59 S. Ct. 595, 83 L. ed. 927 (x938).
0LI Wall. 113, 2o L. ed. 122 (1870).
"0326 U. S. 572, 577, 66 S. Ct. 310, 312, 9o L. ed. 265 (1946).
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the trend of decision favored limitation on immunity. He then pro-
posed his test of immunity-"But so long as Congress generally taps
a source of revenue by whomsoever earned and not uniquely capable
of being earned only by a State, the Constitution of the United States
does not forbid it merely because its incidence falls also on a State."
And he indicated only two specific instances of uniqueness-"Only a
State can own a Statehouse; only a State can get income by taxing."
67
The approach used by Mr. Justice Frankfurter is significant in
three aspects: one, it strongly emphasizes federal supremacy in the tax
field and reiterates federal immunity; two, it proposes a limitation on
state immunity which will completely destroy the balance between
our dual governments unless equally applied to federal instrumentali-
ties; and, three, it rejects the test based on the distinction between pro-
prietary and governmental activity to determine taxability of state in-
strumentalities.68
Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred in this opinion with the restriction
that "before a federal tax can be applied to activities carried on direct-
ly by the states, the intention of Congress to tax them should be stated
expressly and not drawn merely from general wording of the statute
applicable ordinarily to private sources of revenue."' 6 9 He then ex-
pressed grave doubts that Congress intended such taxation here, but
acquiesced in the result of the decision on the authority of South Caro-
lina v. United States.
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Stone, joined by Justices
Reed, Murphy, and Burton, stated that the decision was supported by
precedent, but regarded as untenable the various criteria used in past
cases to limit the taxing power of Congress. However, he felt that
the national government may not constitutionally lay a non-discrimina-
tory tax on every class of property and activities of states and individ-
uals alike:
"But our difficulty with the formula, now first suggested as of-
' 326 U. S. 572, 582, 66 S. Ct. 310, 314, go L. ed. 265 (1946).
"However, on the basis of two other opinions in the case, one concurring with
and one dissenting from the Frankfurter opinion, Professor Dowling regards the
principal case as an encouraging indication of concern for the maintenance of sub-
stantial state authority: "The opinions by Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice
Douglas reveal more concern over the preservation of the states in this federal sys-
tem and the continued operations of local government than I can recall for the
past eight years or more; it is refreshing to observe that they were speaking for
six members of the Court." Dowling, Constitutional Developments in Five War
Years (1946) 32 Va. L. Rev. 461, 466.
0326 U. S. 572, 585, 66 S. Ct. 310, 315, 90 L. ed. 265 (1946).
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fering a new solution for an old problem, is that a federal tax
which is not discriminatory as to the subject matter may never-
theless so affect the State, merely because it is a State that is be-
ing taxed, as to interfere unduly with the State's performance of
its sovereign functions of government."
70
As a substitute, Chief Justice Stone proposed that "the effect of the
immunity on the national taxing power is to be determined not quan-
titatively but by its operation and tendency in withdrawing taxable
property or activities from the reach of federal taxation," 71 and each
case must be decided on its own facts balancing the burden on the
state government against the restriction on federal taxing power.
Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion, concurred in by Mr.
Justice Black, goes to the root of the evil by advocating the overruling
of South Carolina v. United States72 and the line of decisions predicated
thereon, and reestablishment of the doctrine of concurrent taxing
powers and reciprocal immunities of the state and federal governments.
He points out that the power to tax is an effective form of regulation,
"and no more powerful instrument for centralization of government
could be devised. For with the federal government immune and the
States subject to tax, the economic ability of the federal government
to expand its activities at the expense of the States is at once ap-
parent." 73 His argument is clinched by pointing out that the danger
of the expanded program of state activities drying up sources of federal
revenue is as remote as the spectre of socialism, and such expansion has
in fact increased the tax potential of the federal government.
In view of the failure of criteria in the past to delineate the scope
of taxing power, it appears that the simple doctrine proposed by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter is the solution to the problem, but only if the con-
current taxing power of federal and state governments is reinstituted
and such immunities as exist under this rule are applied reciprocally.
It is undoubtedly true that Chief Justice Marshall regarded the
federal taxing power as supreme, with constitutional immunity apply-
ing only to the federal government. Of need he must, at a time when
such an attitude was necessary to preserve and strengthen the national
government. And, as previously shown, when a balance of economic
and political power was reached between federal and state govern-
1326 U. S. 572, 586, 66 S. Ct. 31o, pi6, go L. ed. 265 (1946).
7326 U. S. 572, 590, 66 S. Ct. 1o, 318, go L. ed. 265 (1946).
7199 U. S. 437, 26 S. Ct. 110, 5o L. ed. 261 (1905).
"326 U. S. 572, 594, 66 S. Ct. 310, 320, go L. ed. 265 (1946).
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ments this idea was repudiated, concurrent taxing power and recipro-
cal immunities becoming the judicial attitude. Yet, today, when the
federal government has reached an unexcelled state of power and in-
fluence, the Supreme Court tends toward reinstitution of Marshall's
concept, thereby facilitating the further development of centralized
government.
The argument for the doctrine of federal taxation supremacy is
based on the fact that the federal government is a government of enu-
merated powers. Thus, it is maintained that any lawful exercise of this
power is a governmental function.74 The answers of this contention
appear obvious. The federal government is, in fact, conducting wide
business enterprises which are purely proprietary in nature. Thus, the
wording of the grants of enumerated powers is sufficiently broad to
cover propriety as well as governmental functions. Furthermore, even
though the states are governments of reserved powers, any activity con-
ducted by the states in lawful pursuance of these powers is equally
governmental or proprietary.7 5 It follows that whatever immunity
flows from the Constitution must be reciprocal.
The additional argument that taxation of the whole is different
from taxation of a part is rather question-begging. Of necessity it is
different, but the difference is an economic or political one and not
judicial. As a practical matter the underlying danger is the same, the
possible eventual destruction of one government by the other through
uncurbed taxing power in one coupled with an immunity from tax-
ation by the other. True, the power of taxation is not the power to
destroy so long as the Supreme Court sits, but only so long as the court
protects the states through a power of taxation and an immunity from
taxation reciprocal with that of the federal government.
All arguments underlying the rule of taxation of state proprietary
enterprises equally apply to taxation of national proprietary interests.
If the states by entering the business field deprive the federal govern-
ment of legitimate subjects of taxation, even to a greater extent is the
federal government now depriving the states of sources of tax revenue.
In both situations, if immunity existed, some taxing sources are elim-
inated, but on the other hand, new sources of taxable wealth and
"See a full development of this position by Stoke, State Taxation and the New
Federal Instrumentalities (1936) 22 Iowa L. Rev. 39.
"See discussions on this side of the problem: Brown, Intergovernmental Tax
Immunity: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment? (1940) 25 Wash. U. L. Q.
153; Watkins, The Power of the State and Federal Governments to Tax One An-
other (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 475; Note (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1323.
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property are incidentally created. The burden, economically and
politically, is as great where the state is taxed as where the federal
government is taxed.
The practical effect of the trend of decisions will not be immediately
apparent in sweeping centralization of government. 76 For, after all,
Congress, composed of peoples from the states, can at will restore the
balance of providing in its enactments for exemption of the states from
the application of federal taxation, or in the statutes creating federal
instrumentalities provide for grants to the states affected in lieu of
taxation, or provide for state taxation of the instrumentalities it
creates. Furthermore, both Congress and the executive branch are
equally, with the Supreme Court, guardians of the Constitution. But
in the last analysis only the Supreme Court can prevent the ultimate
full play of political and economic factors tending toward the com-
plete overthrow of the balance of power between the states and the
nation.
CARTm GLAss, I
7'For a complete analysis of the recent cases in this field see: Powell, The
Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities (1945) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 633; Powell.
The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities (1945) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 757-
See also Note (1946) 41 Iii. L. Rev. 139 on New York v. United States.
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